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Abstract—Most of the work that has been done to build 
reliable interactive systems has been focusing on avoiding the 
occurrence of faults during the development of the system, 
using for instance formal verification techniques. However, 
empirical studies have demonstrated that software crashes 
may occur at runtime, even if the development has been 
extremely rigorous. One of the many sources of such crashes 
is called natural faults triggered by alpha-particles from 
radioactive contaminants in the chips or neutron from cosmic 
radiation. A higher probability of occurrence of faults 
concerns systems deployed in the high atmosphere (e.g. 
aircrafts) or in space (e.g. manned spacecraft). Therefore 
mechanisms are needed to deal with these faults and 
guarantee that the system will work correctly even in the 
presence of these faults. To deal with this issue, this paper 
proposes a fault-tolerant software architecture and its formal 
specification applied to embedded, real-time interactive 
systems. 
Keywords—Dependability, Widgets, Fault Tolerance, 
Formal Description Techniques, Interactive cockpits, Fault-
Tolerant Architecture 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A safety-critical system is a system in which any failure 
or error has the potential to lead to loss of lives or to injury 
human beings [13] while a system is called critical when the 
cost of a potential error is much higher than the cost of 
development. Whether or not they are classified as safety-
critical or critical, interactive systems have made their way 
into most of the command and control workstations 
including satellite ground segments, military and civil 
cockpits, air traffic control... The complexity and quantity of 
data manipulated, the amount of systems to be controlled 
and the high number of commands to be triggered in a short 
period of time have pulled sophisticated interaction 
techniques into most of them.  
Building reliable interactive systems is a cumbersome 
task due to their very specific nature. Their behavior is 
usually event-driven making them belong to the reactive 
systems category. Beyond that, the main trigger for these 
events is the operator of the interactive systems usually 
behaving in an unexpected and unpredictable way. On the 
output side, information (e.g. the current state of the system) 
has to be presented to the operator in such a way as it can be 
perceived and interpreted correctly. Lastly, interactive 
systems require addressing simultaneously hardware and 
software aspects (e.g. input and output devices together with 
their device drivers).  
Due to these specificities standard software engineering 
approaches cannot be reused for building reliable interactive 
systems. To address this challenge a lot of work has been 
carried out in the engineering interactive systems 
community extending and refining approaches including 
software architectures [7] formal description techniques and 
verification ([16], [8] and [14]) or testing ([12], [10] and 
[24]). Most of these works have been focusing on avoiding 
the occurrence of faults by removing software defects prior 
to operation i.e. during the development of the interactive 
system. The use of such techniques is particularly adequate 
when applied to safety-critical interactive systems (e.g. 
aircraft cockpits) as return on investment and cost-benefits 
trade-offs are covered by their safety-critical nature.  
In the domain of fault-tolerant systems empirical studies 
have demonstrated (e.g. [23]) that software crashes may 
occur even though the development of the system has been 
extremely rigorous. One of the many sources of such 
crashes is called natural faults [3] triggered by alpha-
particles from radioactive contaminants in the chips or 
neutron from cosmic radiation. A higher probability of 
occurrence of faults [28] concerns systems deployed in the 
high atmosphere (e.g. aircrafts) or in space (e.g. manned 
spacecraft [17]). 
Such natural faults demonstrate the need to go beyond 
classical fault avoidance at development time (mainly based 
on formal description techniques and associated verification 
methods) and to embed fault-tolerant approaches to handle 
faults that may occur at operation time. In the area of 
dependable systems such issues have been studied and 
current state of the art in the field identifies four different 
ways to increase a system’s reliability ([3] and [13]): 
 Fault avoidance: preventing the occurrence of faults 
by construction (usually using formal description 
techniques and proving properties [25]). 
 Fault removal: reducing the number of faults that can 
occur (by verification of properties).  
These first two mechanisms belong to the so-called zero-
defect approach aiming at acting in the development phase 
for preventing faults from occurring.  
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 Fault forecasting: estimating the number, future 
incidence and likely consequences of faults (usually by 
statistical evaluation). 
 Fault tolerance: avoiding service failure in the 
presence of faults (usually by adding redundancy, 
multiple versions and voting mechanisms). 
This paper focuses on the natural faults which will occur 
regardless the effort deployed during development phases. 
To increase the system reliability concerning these faults 
which occur during operations, this paper proposes a 
software architecture in order to address fault-tolerance. 
Fault-tolerance will be achieved by covering the following 
aspects: 
 Fault detection: identifying the presence of faults, the 
type of the fault and possibly its source,  
 Fault recovery: transforming the system state that 
contains one or more faults into a state without fault. 
Beyond the proposed software architectures, we present 
how to use a model-based approach for describing, in a 
complete and unambiguous way, the various elements of the 
software architecture. Combining the zero-defect approach 
with the fault-tolerant one we will describe how to add fault 
detection and fault recovery mechanisms to interactive 
systems. This work thus extends previous work in the area 
of dependable computing by taking into account the 
specificities of interactive systems and adapting previous 
contribution to them.  
As far as interaction technique is concerned, in this 
paper we are focusing on standard indirect manipulation 
techniques for which display and control take place through 
a predefined set of widgets (e.g. buttons, labels …). Even 
though a lot of more sophisticated interaction techniques are 
proposed and evaluated by the HCI community such 
indirect manipulation interaction style follows standards in 
the area of safety-critical interactive systems such as 
ARINC 661 specification for interactive civil cockpits [2]. 
Due to their standardized behavior and graphical 
representation user interfaces based on widgets are faster to 
design and easier to implement than the one offering direct 
manipulation interactions. This is the reason why user 
interfaces for critical command and control systems offer 
menu and form-based interactions based on standard 
widgets such as buttons, check boxes, radio boxes … 
Implementation of such interfaces usually exploit 
component based approaches [29] where the user interface 
consists in an assembly of reused software components.  
Such approaches present a set of advantage improving 
reliability (as the components are reused and thus usually 
widely tested), development cost efficiency (components are 
produced by third parties and are uses “as is” by many 
“clients”), development time efficiency (the designer 
focuses only on the assembly of the components and not 
their design) …  
This paper is structured as follows. Next section is 
dedicated to the generic architecture of component-based 
interactive systems. Section III proposes a software 
architecture for embedding fault-tolerance mechanisms in 
interactive systems and more precisely in widgets. To avoid 
faults in the design of the components enabling fault-
tolerance, they have been formally modeled using a Petri 
nets-based formal description technique. In order to 
exemplify the concepts and to demonstrate their 
applicability, section IV presents their formal specification. 
The last section concludes the paper. 
II. ARCHITECTURE OF A COMPONENT-BASED 
INTERACTIVE SYSTEM 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of critical interactive systems (from 
input devices to interactive applications) adapted from [7] 
Figure 1 presents a revised version of the ARCH 
software architecture introduced in [9]. We have used it to 
explicit the functional architecture of most of the interactive 
and user-driven systems. Logical Level and Presentation 
Technique Interactive Components (the last two ones on the 
right-hand side of the original ARCH model) have been 
replaced by input and output devices, window manager and 
widgets. Indeed, from a functional point of view, a 
component-based interactive application (Figure 1, should 
be ridden from left to right) may be seen as a five parts 
system: 
 Input and output devices: classically screens, 
keyboards, mice… ; but they can be more complex 
(e.g. combined devices such as the KCCU (Keyboard 
Cursor Control Unit) in interactive cockpits). They 
allow the interaction (at the hardware level) between 
the human and the computer. 
 Window manager: embedding devices drivers, it 
manages the link between the input and output devices 
and the rest of the application. For example, it is 
responsible for the management of the graphical 
cursors, the identification of the widget which is 
targeted by user action on the input devices (called 
picking), the dispatching of the input device events to 
the corresponding widgets and the rendering of 
graphical information on the output device. 
 Widgets: the basic interactive components. They are 
represented in a separate box in Figure 1 as we 
consider here the widgets as independent components.   
 Dialog controller: describes the application states and 
behavior and how events received from the previous 
components trigger state changes in the application and 
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how those state changes trigger rendering function 
execution in the lower level components.  
 Functional code adapter and functional core 
components are embedding the non-interactive 
functionalities of the system. 
III. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR FAULT-TOLERANT WIDGETS 
A. Main Hypotheses and Functional Failures Taken into 
Account 
This paper focuses on system-side dependability of 
interactive system and considers human-error as out of 
scope. This is indeed a very strong hypothesis but human 
reliability aspects can be considered independent from the 
ones addressed here and natural faults at operation time are 
not influenced by operator’s behavior. As shown in 
section II these aspects are pertinent and are required to be 
dealt with adequately if the entire socio technical system is 
to be considered. 
We only tackle the functional failures of the widgets ; 
the main part of the considered architecture in Figure 1. 
Moreover, input and output devices, dialog controller and 
functional core and the window manager are considered out 
of the scope of this paper. 
Our proposed software architecture aims at ensuring that 
the interactive system processes correctly input events from 
operators, and renders correctly parameters received from 
the functional core. To be more concrete, we are targeting at 
managing three possible functional failures: 
 Erroneous display: Incorrect display of data received 
from functional core (e.g. a widget receives a value to 
render and displays another value); 
 Erroneous control: Transmission of a different action 
from the one done by the user (e.g. the user clicks on 
button1 but the application sends an event from 
button2); 
 Inadvertent control: Transmission of an action 
without any user’s action (e.g. an event click is sent to 
the application without user action on the input 
devices). 
B. An Architecture for Fault-Tolerant Widgets 
In this section, we describe a solution for building fault-
tolerant interactive applications. To this end, we propose to 
apply and customize fault-tolerant architectures to the 
widgets.  
Various architectures are available in the dependable 
computing community, each of them having drawbacks and 
advantages. We present in detail how to use a self-checking 
architecture to design widgets able to detect faults which 
occur during their execution. 
1) An Architecture for Self-Checking Widgets 
The architecture presented in Figure 2 is a good 
candidate for embedding fault-detection mechanisms into 
widgets. According to this architecture, the self-checking is 
made up of 5 connected sub-components: 
 The façade is the envelope of the widget, coordinating 
the flow of data amongst the other sub-components. 
This encapsulation of the other inner components 
makes it possible to hide (as much as possible) the 
self-checking nature of the component to the rest of the 
application (including other non-self-checking 
widgets). This is an important characteristic if one has 
to develop an applications embedding two types of 
widgets (a self-checking one and a non-self-checking 
one). As the self-checking mechanism requires a lot of 
resources (both at design time and at execution time), 
it should be used only for components involved in 
critical interactions, implying the coexistence of both 
fault-tolerant and non-fault-tolerant components within 
the same application. 
 The dispatcher: events and method calls received by 
the self-checking widget are forwarded to the 
dispatcher. The dispatcher then duplicates events and 
sends them both to the functional and controller. It 
manages all methods calls and events by means of a 
queuing mechanism: each input is stored and processed 
following the first-in/first-out principle. The 
dispatcher has to deal with temporal constraints of 
execution ensuring that functional and controller 
receive event in a synchronous way. 
 The functional is the classical widget. The functional 
sends its outputs both to the self-checking widget and 
the comparator.  
 The controller is a second version of some of the 
functionalities of the widget. It only implements the 
functionalities that have to be supervised by the 
controller. Its behavior is simpler than the one of the 
functional and is thus more reliable. The controller 
sends its output to the comparator.  
 The comparator is in charge of comparing the 
functional and controller outputs. There are two kinds 
of comparisons to perform: one related to parameters 
modification and the other related to event notification. 
When the comparator receives an output from the 
functional (resp. the controller) it waits for the 
corresponding output from the controller (resp. the 
functional). Following the reception of these two 
outputs, two types of errors can occur: one of the 
outputs is ill-timed (too late or too early) with respect 
to the defined temporal window or the outputs hold 
different values. In case of error, the comparator sends 
an error event) to the self-checking widget. 
 
 
Figure 2. Self-Checking architecture for fault detection. 
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One of the key aspects of the proposed architecture is 
that it allows the segregation of the five sub-components 
(e.g. each sub-component may be executed on different 
processor with different resources). Indeed, a self-checking 
mechanism is not enough to ensure fault-tolerance if a fault 
occurring on one component might interfere with the 
behavior of another component. This would be the case if all 
the components of the architecture were executed in the 
same partition. ARINC 653 [1] defines such partitioning in 
the domain of civil aviation and our contribution is 
compatible with that standard. 
IV. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF THE FAULT-TOLERANT 
INTERACTIVE COMPONENTS 
It is clear that the proposed self-checking widget 
architecture relies heavily on the dependability of all its 
components. Indeed, all the components and mechanisms 
related to error detection must be reliable. Therefore, in a 
self-checking widget, the components enabling the fault-
detection (e.g. the dispatcher, the controller, the 
comparator and the façade) are supposed to be defect-free. 
We propose to ensure the integrity of the components 
enabling the fault-detection by the use of the ICO 
(Interactive Cooperative Objects) formal description 
technique to describe them in a complete and unambiguous 
way. In this section, we introduce a self-checking widget 
specification using the ICO formalism with the example of 
the self-checking PicturePushButton. We choose the 
example of the PicturePushButton as it is a widely used 
widget and is also representative of most interactive widgets 
defined in ARINC 661 as most interactive widgets share 
common properties such as visibility, enabling… Although 
this example might look rather simple at first glance, we can 
see that its behavioural description (presented on Figure. 3) 
is rather complex. All five components of the self-checking 
PicturePushButton (façade, dispatcher, functional,, 
controller and comparator) are described using the ICO 
formalism. 
A. ICO, a Formal description Technique 
Interactive Cooperative Objects (ICO) is a formal 
description technique dedicated to the specification and 
verification of interactive systems [20]. It uses concepts 
borrowed from the object-oriented approach (dynamic 
instantiation, classification, encapsulation, inheritance, 
client/server relationship) to describe the structural or static 
aspects of interactive systems, and uses high-level Petri 
nets [19] to describe their dynamic or behavioural aspects. It 
is an extension of the Cooperative Objects formalisms that 
has been designed to describe behavioural aspects of 
objects-based distributed systems [9] and [10].  
The formalism is able to handle the specific aspects of 
interactive systems. In a nutshell, the ICO formalism: 
 Is Petri net based, suitable to specify the behavior of 
event driven-interactive systems and concurrent 
human-computer interactions and to describe the inner 
states of the Interactive Application. 
 Enables the handling of more complex data structure 
(typed places and tokens, transitions with actions and 
preconditions, variable names on arcs). 
 Allows objects of this type to react to external events 
according to their inner state and to produce events 
 Defines an object as the set of four elements: a 
Cooperative Object which describes the behavior of 
the object, a presentation part, and two functions (the 
activation function and the rendering function) that 
make the link between the cooperative objet and the 
presentation part (events from input devices and output 
on the LCD screens). 
B. ICO Modelling of the Self-Checking Widget 
1) Classical Widget 
In previous work [4], we have proposed the use of the 
ICO formal description technique for describing in a 
complete and unambiguous way standard widgets.  
Figure. 3 shows the ICO model of a non-self-checking 
PPB (we only put here the snapshot of the model as the 
detail of its behavior is not interesting per se for the purpose 
of the paper). The parts of this behavior that are relevant for 
the fault-tolerant mechanism are explained when required in 
the following section but the entire behavioral description of 
the PPB can be found in [4]. 
The model of Figure. 3 presents the various states the 
PPB can be in (e.g. visible, enable), the set of method calls 
he can process (e.g. processMouseClick, setLabelString), 
the set of events it can trigger (e.g. 
A661_EVT_SELECTION) and when such events are 
triggered (e.g. if the PPB is visible, enable and receives a 
method call processMouseClick the event 
A661_EVT_SELECTION is triggered).  
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Figure. 3. ICO model of a PicturePushButton 
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2) Adding Fault-Tolerance 
Adding fault-tolerance mechanism to the 
PicturePushButton is the result of the merge of the five 
subparts of the self-checking component architecture 
presented in Figure 2 (the façade, the dispatcher, the 
functional, the controller and the comparator). As said 
previously, all five components of the self-checking 
PicturePushButton are described using the ICO formalism. 
As explained in section III, the functional is the 
classical widget as illustrated by Figure. 3 and the behavior 
of the controller must be close to the one of the functional 
as it has to provide the same outputs (events and parameters 
modifications) to be checked for conformity by the 
comparator. Figure. 5 presents the ICO model of the 
controller of the self-checking PicturePushButton. We don’t 
detail the behavior here but it is clearly different and simpler 
than the function described in Figure. 3. Thanks to the 
formal description performed using ICO, behavioral 
equivalence can be checked using results from the Petri nets 
theory such as the ones presented in [11]. These aspects are 
not relevant for the current paper but are of prime 
importance for the engineering of fault-tolerant interactive 
systems. 
The façade being very simple to design as it is only a 
sort of wrapper allowing the application to discuss with the 
widget ; the main challenge is then to design the dispatcher 
and the comparator. The dispatcher and the comparator of 
the self-checking PicturePushButton are two really large and 
complicated models, they cannot be presented in this paper 
due to lack of readability of the figure. However, the 
modeling of these two components has exhibited three 
generic patterns, one enabling the building of the 
dispatcher; the others two enabling the building of the 
comparator. We introduce here the specification of these 
generic patterns that can be seen as underlying building 
bricks of the components enabling the fault detection. 
a) Dispatching Pattern 
Figure 4 shows the pattern responsible for the 
dispatching of one input setParameterX(). To be able to 
communicate using a synchronous communication 
mechanism, the model needs a reference to the receivers i.e. 
the functional and the controller. These references are 
stored in the places named resp. functional and controller. 
The input is received as a token in the place called 
SIP_setParameterX, and the value it holds is then associated 
to a queuing number (produced by the transition 
setParameterX) and stored in place queueParameterX. 
When the number of the next parameter to handle (this 
value is stored in place nextToFireParameterX) matches the 
value in place queueParameterX, the input value is sent to 
both functional and controller components by the firing 
transition dispatchParameterX and waits for confirmation. 
Finally, when the dispatcher has received both functional 
and controller acknowledgements (a token with the right 
queuing number must be held by places ParameterX_F and 
ParameterX_C), it is ready to process a new input, if any. 
 
Figure 4. Dispatch of the input requesting the modification 
of the value of ParameterX of the PPB 
This pattern is applicable to any kind of input services 
proposed by any widget (some small modifications may be 
needed on these patterns function of the service studied), for 
instance, the dispatcher of the self-checking 
PicturePushButton is composed of 14 of these patterns; one 
for each service proposed by the widget.  
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Figure. 5. ICO model of the controller of the self-checking PicturePushButton 
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Figure 6. Comparison of ParameterX values 
 
a) Comparator Patterns 
We identified two generic patterns for the comparator: 
(: (i) one for service execution (see Figure 6) ; (ii) one for 
event sending (see Figure 7). 
Comparison of service execution 
The pattern presented in Figure 6 manages the 
comparison of the processing of a request of a parameter 
modification of the PicturePushButton. Four cases are 
possible and are represented by the four transitions at the 
center of Figure 6: 
1. The value sent by the controller and the functional 
are the same, then transition ParameterX_Ok is fired 
and the comparator does not send an error notification 
(right-hand side of the figure).  
 
2. The values received from both controller and 
functional are different, then transition 
ErrorParameterX is fired and the comparator raises as 
output an event "ErrorParameterX" that will be received 
by the application to which the widget belongs.  
 
3/4. A more severe failure might occur in the controller 
or in the functional making one of them impossible to 
send a value to the comparator. In such cases the 
corresponding timed transitions ErrorParameterX_C or 
ErrorParameterX_F is fired which results in triggering 
of the event "ErrorParameterX".  
 
The case in which neither the functional nor the 
controller send a result is not considered here due to the 
segregation. Indeed, as both functional and controller have 
been developed independently and are executed in different 
partitions the probability of occurrence of such a case is 
below the 10
-9
 required for safety critical functions.  
Comparison of event sending 
The pattern presented in Figure 7 exhibits a very similar 
behavior as the one presented in Figure 6 and is applied to 
event processing. The only difference is related to the fact 
that the event does not carry any value and thus if it is 
received, its value is correct. 
The comparator of the self-checking PicturePushButton 
is composed of 8 service execution comparison patterns and 
1 event sending comparison pattern. 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of an Event sending 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented that interactive 
applications in the context of safety critical systems (such as 
in interactive cockpits) raise specific issues about fault-
tolerance. As interactions between the operator and the 
system takes place through standardized interactive 
components called widgets there is a need to enrich them 
with fault-tolerant mechanisms. We have proposed a new 
architecture and a model-based description of the 
components of an ARINC 661 widget that includes both a 
functional and a controller implementing runtime checks of 
the specified behavior of a widget. Despite the fact that the 
interaction techniques are rather limited (only WIMP ones) 
this contribution can be seen as a milestone for developing 
robust architectures for interactive cockpits.  
The core of such an architecture (that includes such self-
checking interactive component) is clearly its binding with 
the formal description technique thus providing a complete 
and unambiguous specification of such mechanisms.  
This model-based approach is the backbone of a more 
ambitious project of providing notations, processes and 
tools for the engineering of dependable and fault-tolerancet 
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interactive applications. We are currently working on 
extending this self-checking mechanism to more 
components of the interactive system. 
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